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BUFFALO LAW1 REVIEW
Coope v. Loew's Gates Theater, 215 App. Div. 259, 261, 213 N. Y. Supp.
254, 256 (3rd Dept. 1926). Cf. Katz v. Kadans, supra. In the Loew's case a
ticket seller was assaulted by a jealous woman who imagined the claimant was
seeing her husband. An award was reversed because the assault was not out of
the employment due to the fact that the claimant was safer in the ticket booth,
and consequently was not exposed to any special peril.
In the instant case the trial examiner found that the employee had not been
seeing the assailant's wife. The employee, therefore, being an innocent party would
be entitled to workmen's compensation if his type of work exposed him to a special danger. A laundryman who must regularly visit the homes of customers is
likely to be subjected to suspicious and jealous husbands, and an assault on him
by such an assailant during the course of his employment should be compensable
as arising out of the employment.
Sheldon Hurwitz

CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-CRIMINAL INTENT
The defendant carried away three tons of bomb casings from a Government
bombing range and was convicted for violation of 18 U. S. C. Sec. 641 which
provides that "whoever embezzles, steals or knowingly converts government property is punishable by fine or imprisonment." Defendant alleged that he believed
the casings to be abandoned property. The trial court refused to allow the question of defendant's wrongful or criminal intent to be presented to the jury. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, construing the statute as not requiring a showing of
criminal intent. Morissette v. United States, 187 F. 2d 427 (6 Cir. 1951). The
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that intent is a prerequisite under any of
the alternatives stated within the statute. Morissette v. United States, 342
U. S.246 (1952).
Ordinarily a criminal intent is an intent to do knowingly and wilfully that
which is condemned as wrong by the law and common morality of the country.
People v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E.792 (1909). At common law actus
non reum facit, sed mens was a valid maxim. To constitute crime, there must not
only have been the act itself but also the criminal intention. It was necessary that
they concur for both were equally essential. Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13
Am. Rep. 492 (1873).
When an act denounced by the law is proved to have been committed, in the
absence of contrary evidence, the criminal intent is inferred from the commission
of the act. Nassan v. United States, 126 F. 2d 613 (4 Cir. 1942). The inference
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may be removed by the attending circumstances showing the absence of such
intent. If the intent be dependent on knowledge of certain facts, a want of such
knowledge, not resulting from negligence or carelessness, will relieve the act of
criminality. Gordon v. State, 52 AL. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575 (1875).
It is not necessary for an act to be criminal that the offender intend to commit
the crime to which his act amounts; it is merely necessary that he intend to do the
act which constitutes the crime. State v. Fulco, 194 La. 545, 194 So. 14 (1940).
Whether it is incumbent on the sovereign to show a criminal knowledge as an
element of statutory offenses, is now a matter of construction to be determined
from the statute's language and purpose. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 345 Pa. 456,
28 A. 2d 894 (1942). When an act is prohibited and made punishable by statute
only, the statute is to be construed in the light of the common law and the existence
of a criminal intent is to be regarded as essential even though in terms not required.
Smith v. State, 233 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270 (1931). The circumstance that the
word "knowingly" or its equivalent does not appear in a statute is not conclusive;
but the question whether words expressing criminal intent or guilty knowledge are
to be implied is again a matter of construction. The evil sought to be prevented
and the consequence of the various construction to which the statute may be
susceptible will determine its construction. State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204
Pac. 958 (1922). The Legislature does have this power to eliminate the element
of intent from statutory crimes but that purpose should be so clearly stated as to
leave no room for doubt. United States v. Great A. & P. Co of America, 111 W.
Va. 148, 161 S. E. 5 (1951).
The intent to steal is a necessary ingredient of the offense of larceny. The
burden rests on the people to show that the property was taken animo furandi.
Downs v. New Jersey Fidelity & P. G. Ins. Co., 91 N. J. L. 523 103 Ad.
205 (1918).
If it appears that the taking was consistent with honest conduct, the taker
cannot be convicted. Larceny demands felonious intent and without it thei- can
be only trespass which, however aggravated, would not constitute this crime.
McCourt v. People, 64 N. Y. 253 (1876); Flint v. State, 143 Fla. 259, 196 So.
619 (1940).
In the instant case, the statute provided that one must knowingly convert in
order that he may be found guilty. These words have been construed, when used
in a statute, to require that the person accused have knowledge of the essential
facts from which the law may presume a knowledge of the legal consequences.
United States v. Martinez, 73 F. Supp. 403 (M. D. Pa. 1947); People v. McCalla,
63 Cal. App. 783, 220 Pac. 436 (1923); Gottlieb v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 807
101 S. E.873 (1920).
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Where there has been an exception to the necessity for intent, it has accrued
in statutes intended to maintain a public policy. Many instances are to be found
in regulatory measures stemming from the exercise of the police power which
emphasizes the achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment
of crime. Shevrin Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57 (1909). The crimes
created primarily for the purpose of singling out wrongdoers for punishment or
correction commonly require mens rea. Those punishable without it are mainly
offenses which are regulatory in nature and involve light fines rather than imprisonment. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col Law Rev. 55 (1933).
The defendant's conviction was properly reversed. Ordinarily for there to
be a felony conviction the defendant's physical act must be accompanied by mens
rea. This is particularly true in the principal case where the statute's express
words are "knowingly converts,' and where the statute is a codification of the
common law crime of larceny which had required a guilty mind.
Charles Ryan Desmond
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-COLLATERAL ATTACK OF DIVORCE
DECREE RENDERED IN A SISTER STATE
This was an action brought by Arthur Cook, the Respondent, against Florence Cook, the Petitioner, to annul two marriages between the parties. Petitioner
and Respondent were married in 1943. Respondent then learned that his wife was
still married to her previous husband. The parties agreed that Petitioners should
go to Florida and obtain a divorce. Shortly after the divorce Petitioner and
Respondent were remarried. Marital difficulties followed. Respondent brought
the present action in the Vermont courts, to have his two marriages to the Petitioner annulled. He alleged that at the time of his two marriages to Florence
Cook, she was already married. The Supreme Court of Vermont granted the
annulments on the grounds that full faith and credit need not be given to the
Florida decree because Petitioner was not a bona fide domiciliary of Florida at
the time of her divorce. Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A. 2d 593 (1950). In as
much as the record does not show whether or not the husband was personally
served or whether he appeared in the Florida proceedings, the United States
Supreme Court remanded the cause for a determination of this issue before it
would allow a collateral attack on the Florida decree. Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct.
157 (1951).
Prior to 1942, in order for a spouse to obtain a divorce which was entitled
to full faith and credit, it was necessary that the suit be instituted at the matrimonial domicile, Atherton v. Atherton 181 U. S. 155, (1901); or there had to

